We examine whether the increase in the flow of capital to hedge funds over the period 1994-2005 had a negative impact on performance. More specifically, we study the relative performance of small versus large funds for each of the hedge fund strategies. Our results indicate that on an absolute return basis, small funds outperform large funds. On a risk-adjusted return basis, however, we find that large funds outperform small funds, and that large funds are also shown to hold less liquid assets and take on less systematic and idiosyncratic risk than small funds. Finally, funds that experience positive liquidity shocks generally outperform those that experience negative liquidity shocks. Except for fixed-income funds, hedge fund managers that are aggressive in dealing with liquidity shocks perform better than hedge fund managers that are conservative in dealing with liquidity shocks.
I. Introduction
Assets Under Management in the Hedge Fund industry have grown at a very fast pace over the past decade due in large part to their success in both bull and bear markets, superior manager skills and efficient fee structure. 1 The advantages of a large asset base include more resources for research, increased ability to attract investment talent, increased efficiency in broker/dealers relationship. On the other hand, as assets increase it becomes more difficult to find alpha and identify the next generation of absolute return opportunities. Moreover, large funds may incur significant liquidity costs both with respect to getting in and out of trades as well as having to put their money into their second and perhaps third best ideas.
2 Berk and Green (2004) develop a rational equilibrium model of active fund management.
They assume decreasing returns to scale, the presence of competitive provision of capital by investors and that there is differential ability to generate high returns across managers that is learned through past performance. They conclude that active managers do not outperform passive benchmarks and that manager performance does not persist. An important implication of their model is that fund managers have skills and that the level of skill is not uniform. More interestingly, their model implies that skill of a fund manger is not measured by the fund performance but by the fund size.
3 Scholes (2004) suggests that there is a delicate balance between the returns that can be earned from hedge funds and the capital supplied. He points out that as more capital is supplied to hedge funds, returns will decline, which will in turn, reduce the flow of capital into that 1 See, for example, Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) , Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) , and Liang (1999 Liang ( , 2001 . 2 Hedges (2004) also argue for the potential presence of organizational diseconomies since managing people is different than managing money, and the quality of personnel is difficult to maintain as fund size grows. 3 Berk and Green (2004) argue that in equilibrium, better managers manage larger funds and all managers who hold portfolios of the same risk are expected to earn the same return regardless of their skill level.
industry. However, more capital attracts talent and enables large hedge funds to provide more liquidity services to the market 4 This represents an important distinction between the characteristics of small and large funds, which suggests that their risk-adjusted performance might also be different.
This paper examines whether the increase in the flow of capital to hedge funds over the period of 1994-2005 had a negative impact on performance. More specifically, we study the relative performance of small versus large hedge funds for alternative investment strategies. Our results indicate that on an absolute return basis, small funds outperform large funds. On a riskadjusted return basis, however, we find that large funds outperform small funds. Moreover, we
find that large funds hold less liquid assets and take on less systematic and idiosyncratic risk than small funds. Except for the fixed-income type of hedge funds, hedge fund managers that are more aggressive in dealing with liquidity shocks perform better than hedge fund managers that are more conservative in dealing with liquidity shocks.
The relation between asset size and hedge fund performance has previously been examined in the literature with conflicting results. Liang (1999) finds that there is a significant positive relation between average returns over the three-year period 1994 through 1996 and the logarithm of fund assets measured as of July 1997. Schneeweis, Kazemi, and Martin (2001) document that fund size is negatively related to the realized returns and its standard deviation over the next four years for Hedge Equity Value, Hedge Equity Growth, and Market Neutral, but not for Merger Arbitrage. 5 Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) find that fund growth (which includes both fund return and flows from investors into funds) is negatively related to fund size. 4 It is possible that small funds cannot afford to provide such liquidity services to the market. 5 Ammann and Moerth (2005) and Hedges (2004) also confirmed this finding.
At the cross-sectional strategy level, Brown, Goetzmann, and Liang (2004) find that the Sharpe ratio is positively related to asset size for both fund of funds and hedge funds.
There are several reasons for the seemingly inconsistent results about the relation between hedge fund asset size and performance. First, there exists a unique dynamic for the growth in hedge fund assets. Getmansky (2005) describes the life cycle of hedge funds by studying the determinants of fund liquidations and flows and the assets to performance relation in the context of fund competition, favorable positioning, and consumer selection. Second, there are economies of scale and scope in fund offering and administration. For example, Hedges (2004) argues that a larger asset base will increase the ability to attract and retain manager talent, better access to companies, and greater bargaining power with broker/dealers.
Third, although flows chase well-performing funds, it is well-documented in the literature that performance of hedge funds only persists for short periods typically from one quarter up to one year (Agarwal and Naik (2000) and Baquero, ter Horst, and Verbeek (2005) ), indicating that a larger asset size may erode fund performance if past good performance attracts more flows into the fund. 6 Indeed, Scholes (2004) argues that the flows into hedge funds are self-defeating in the sense that "the larger the capital supplied to any investment, including hedge funds, the lower the returns."
Fourth, there may be a certain capacity for different hedge fund strategies. For example, Fransolet (2004) argues that the rapid increase in the size of the whole industry may erode much of the profitable investment opportunities. This capacity may depend on the managers' skills (Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2004) ), investment opportunities available (Fransolet (2004) ), trading costs and market impact arising from asset illiquidity (Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov 6 See Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2002) , Baquero and Verbeek (2005) , and Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and Wermers (2007) and Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2005) . (2004)). Thus, when the fund size is lower than its capacity, the fund performance may be positively related to its size. However, when the fund size goes above its capacity, the fund performance may become worse with increased asset size. Moreover, there exists heterogeneity in hedge fund strategies in terms of driving factors.
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Fifth, hedge funds voluntarily report performance results and asset size data to data vendors mainly to attract more capital and to some extent, for publicity purposes. While some large hedge funds may choose to stop reporting their performance results to hedge fund databases after they close their doors to new investors (due to good past performance), other funds may disappear from the database due to liquidation caused by poor performance (Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Liang (2000) ).
This paper is organized in four sections. Section II describes the data sources and examines the sample characteristics. Section III presents our empirical methodology and the models used to examine the potential differences in the return characteristics of small and large hedge funds and its potential impact on performance. Section IV discusses our empirical findings and provides interpretation for our results. Section V provides a brief summary and some concluding remarks.
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics

A. Data Sources
The hedge fund data used in this study are obtained from the Center for International The database is survivor-bias free in the sense that it includes both live and dead funds.
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However, the database may still be subject to self-selection bias as some funds may at times deliberately choose not to disclose their performance information. 11 We choose the period 1994-2005 as the sample period for this study for three reasons. First, this period was characterized by rapid growth of the hedge fund industry. Second, the pre-1994 fund data may be subject to high back-fill bias. Third, this time period is long enough to cover more than one business cycle.
Thus, we are able to examine the behavior and characteristics of hedge funds during both a rising and a declining market.
B. Descriptive Sample Statistics
We study ten widely recognized hedge fund strategies. We further narrow our sample by requiring a fund to have at least 20 valid monthly observations for return and asset under management during the period January 1994 through December 2005. 9 The remaining funds are Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors, which are excluded from this study. 10 Among the studies that attempt to quantify the impact of survivorship bias on hedge fund performance are Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) and Liang (2000) . 11 Unlike mutual funds that are heavily regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940, hedge funds are not required to file fund information with the SEC. Eling and Schuhmacher (2006) argue that the Sharpe ratio is adequate for evaluating investment funds when the returns differ significantly from a normal distribution. Based on return data of 2763 hedge funds, they compare the Sharpe ratio with 12 other performance measures and conclude that all other measures results in virtually identical rank ordering across hedge funds. 13 Bali, Gokcan and Liang (2006) report that the risk profile of defunct funds is different from that of live funds. The relation between downside risk and expected return is found to be negative for defunct funds since taking high risk by these funds can wipe out fund capital, and hence they become defunct. Meanwhile, voluntary closure makes some well performing funds with large assets and low risk fall into the defunct category. They demonstrate how to distinguish live funds from defunct funds on an ex ante basis.
Absolute Returns and Asset Size
An alternative non-parametric approach to least squares is the sorting procedure extensively used in the finance literature. Essentially, we sort all hedge funds into three terciles, large, medium and small, based on their asset size in each of the three four-year sub-periods (1994-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005) for each hedge fund strategy. We first calculate the average monthly return during each of the three periods for each fund, and then delete the medium category and proceed to test the statistical significance of the difference between the small and the large fund categories. Table 3 reports the cross-sectional mean of the average monthly return for small and large funds for each category. We report the t-statistics for the test of the hypothesis that the difference between Small and Large is zero. Given that we have 10 hedge fund strategies and three independent sub-periods, we have the equivalent of 30 independent experiments. Of the 30 tests conducted with absolute returns as the defining variable, we find that in 14 cases, there is a positive and statistically significant difference between the returns of small and large funds indicating that small funds outperform large funds. 14 This is consistent with Ammann and Moerth (2005) who report a negative relation between asset size and absolute return performance in the hedge fund industry.
< Insert Table 3 >
Risk-adjusted Returns (Sharpe) and Asset Size
We follow the same sorting procedure as described before but instead of using absolute returns, we use the Sharpe risk-adjusted performance measure defined as:
where the Sharpe ratio is now the performance measure used to test the difference between small and large funds. Table 4 presents the results for all ten hedge fund strategies across the three subperiods. The results in this table are exactly opposite to the results obtained in Table 3 when absolute hedge fund returns were used as the defining variable. Of the 11 statistically significant differences between small and large funds, 10 are negative indicating that large funds outperform small funds. Edwards and Caglayan (2001) also find a positive relation between asset size and risk adjusted returns but that the return performance increases at a decreasing rate.
< Insert Table 4 >
Whereas on an absolute return basis, small hedge funds appear to outperform large hedge funds, on a risk-adjusted return basis, our results show that indeed large funds outperform small funds. While our findings could be explained by noting that small funds are likely to be more risky than large funds, in the hedge fund industry, risk is fairly hard to estimate and may take on different forms. In the remainder of this section, we first examine the market risk and idiosyncratic risk and then explore the liquidity risk in hedge funds.
Variance Decomposition of Hedge Fund Returns
In a recent article, Giamouridis and Vrontos (2006) study the impact of modeling timevarying covariance/correlations of hedge fund returns in terms of hedge fund portfolio construction and risk measurement. They use a number of static and dynamic covariance/correlation prediction models and compare the optimized portfolios' out-of-sample performance. They report that dynamic covariance/correlation models construct portfolios with lower risk and higher out-of-sample risk-adjusted realized return and that the tail-risk of the constructed portfolios is also lower. Furthermore, Fung and Hsieh (1997) and Agarwal and Naik (2000) show that hedge fund returns display non-linear risk exposure to standard asset markets.
In order to distinguish between market risk and idiosyncratic risk, we decompose the variance of excess returns according to the following standard model:
The variance of excess return is given as:
where is total risk and is the systematic or market risk and ) var(
ε is the fund's idiosyncratic risk (RSS). Table 5 presents the variance decomposition results. There are 15 cases where there are significant differences between small and large funds. In every one of these 15 cases, the total risk estimate is positive, indicating that small funds have more total risk than large funds. More importantly, however, in all of these cases, we observe a significant difference between small and large funds and that the idiosyncratic risk (RSS) as opposed to their market risk is shown to be the overwhelming cause for the higher overall risk of small funds. These results are generally consistent with Agarwal and Naik (2000) who suggest that dynamic trading and option like strategies used by hedge funds lead to more idiosyncratic risk and less exposures to market risk.
< Insert Table 5 >
B. OLS Estimates
Relation between Asset Size and Performance
To examine the relation between asset size and the risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds, we obtain parametric estimates of the following time series model:
where AUM represents assets under management for fund i in period t. We use a log function of relative size to reveal the relationship between the return and the relative fund size. Table 6 reports the mean coefficient estimates for each of the hedge fund strategies. The reported coefficients and t statistics in Table 6 are the mean values averaged across each strategy of the coefficients obtained by estimating the time series model in Equation (4) for individual funds. The estimated size coefficient is on average negative for each of the hedge fund strategies.
We also report the percentage of significant estimates and it ranges between a low 7.9% for Fund of Funds Diversified to a high of 56.5% for Distressed Securities. Evidently, size may not be an important factor in the Fund of Funds category, whereas it plays an important role in the Distressed Securities category of funds.
< Insert Table 6 >
It is important to note that while the overall relation between asset size and excess return performance is in general negative and thus favors smaller funds, the percentages of significant coefficients across each of the hedge fund strategies are not overwhelming. Similar to the findings of Ammann and Moerth (2005) , our results suggest that there might be a negative relation between fund size and performance but only for a subset of the hedge fund universe, and not necessarily for the entire industry. It is therefore difficult to conclude that small funds outperform large funds using parametric methods of estimation such as Ordinary Least Squares regression.
Persistence in the Asset Growth of Hedge Funds
Fund flows to the hedge fund industry may be a critical determinant of its future performance. Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and Wermers (2007) study the effect of flow restrictions on the flow-performance relation. They find that the flow-performance relation for hedge funds is concave in contrast to the convex flow-performance relation for mutual funds. Moreover, they find that money is "smart" in the sense that fund flows predict future hedge fund performance.
Most funds pay particular attention to increase and stabilize their flows. In this section we examine the persistence in their asset growth. Specifically, we estimate the following lagged time series model:
where the coefficients c, d and e are the one, two and three months lagged fund flows respectively. Table 7 presents the estimated asset growth persistence coefficients. Once again, the reported coefficients and t statistics in Table 7 are the mean values averaged across each strategy of the coefficients obtained by estimating the time series model in Equation (5) 
where the first-order autocorrelation lag coefficient serves as a proxy for the asset liquidity of individual hedge funds. Table 8 reports the mean autocorrelation for small and large hedge funds and for each strategy for the three sub-periods. As before, we test the statistical significance between small and large funds with respect to the estimated liquidity variable. In the 10 cases where the difference between small and large funds is statistically significant, all of them show a negative coefficient indicating that large funds are less liquid than small funds. The significant serial correlation found in hedge fund returns is consistent with results in Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) , DeSouza and Gokcan (2004) , Liang (2003) and Edwards and Caglayan (2001) .
< Insert Table 8 >
Larger funds are typically in a better position to control asset flows. In their attempts to control asset flows, larger funds can more easily afford less favorable liquidity conditions by applying longer lockup periods and redemption fees for early withdrawals. As a result, mangers of larger funds may be able to enjoy a more stable asset base and can therefore implement their strategies more consistently and may also be able to invest in illiquid securities that are not priced on a daily basis and therefore reduce the volatility of the fund.
Investor Induced Liquidity and Fund Performance
In this section we model the behavior of hedge fund managers with respect to liquidity.
We postulate two alternative scenarios for fund manager behavior: an aggressive and a conservative response to liquidity shocks. Let assets under management (AUM) at time t be represented as:
where AUM t is the sum of AUM t-1 plus the returns achieved during that period plus the net investment flows (NIF) into the fund during period t, denoted as NIF t . Thus, the fund manager faces liquidity pressures from both asset markets as well as from shareholders. The market liquidity is determined by the nature of the particular assets held in the portfolio, while the liquidity pressures driven by investors are measured by the net investment flows facing a given fund manager. When there is a positive net investment flows, the manager is not particularly impacted by investor driven liquidity. However, when a fund experiences negative net investment flows, the fund manager has to liquidate equity or fixed income positions prematurely which is likely to negatively impact the fund manager performance.
Let IL t represent the investor driven liquidity at time t, and is measured as: We use it in the present context to measure withdrawals by investors. Since investor induced liquidity IL t is the critical variable we will use in evaluating manager behavior, it is useful to examine its characteristics especially as it relates to Excess Returns. For each strategy, Table 9 provides two sets of results on the lagged relation between IL and excess returns. In the first two columns, we estimate excess returns for funds with a positive IL over the past three months and compare them with funds with negative IL values for the past three months. Similarly, in the third and fourth columns, the excess returns are provided for funds with a positive IL in the past one-month to those with a negative IL in the past one-month.
The findings in Table 9 show a very consistent pattern. In every statistically significant observation (bolded), funds that experience a positive investor induced liquidity effect, namely positive fund flows, had higher excess returns than funds that experience a negative IL, namely negative fund flows. This pattern is consistent for both the one-month lag and the three months lag. These results are consistent across most hedge fund strategies including the equity long/short strategy, which is the dominant size category in the industry. Interestingly, these liquidity effects are not at all observed for the Fund of Hedge Funds, suggesting that liquidity concerns are far less significant in those diversified portfolios.
< Insert Table 9 >
Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007) study how incentive fees and manager's own investment in the fund affect the investment strategy of hedge fund managers. They find that risk taking is greatly reduced if a substantial amount of the manager's own money (at least 30%) is in the fund.
Using the Zurich hedge fund universe, they empirically test the relation between risk taking and incentive fees. Hedge funds with incentive fees have significantly lower mean returns (net of fees), while downside risk is positively related to the incentive fee level. Fund of funds charging large incentive fees achieve relatively high mean returns, but with significantly higher risk as well.
To describe the behavior of a hedge fund manager, we consider two alternative specifications for the risk-return models. 15 In the first model, we assume that managers will respond to a liquidity shock in an aggressive manner consistent with the following Aggressive Manager Model:
This equation represents a time series specification in which the manager adjusts the portfolio composition based on the maximum value for IL that was experienced in the prior three month (one quarter).
The alternative scenario assumes that managers will respond to a liquidity shock in a conservative fashion represented by the Conservative Manager Model in which the manager adjusts the portfolio composition based on the minimum value of IL that the fund experienced over the prior three months. The time series representation of the Conservative Manager Model is given as:
Table 10 provides estimates for the regression parameters for the Aggressive and Conservative models. The coefficient estimate for α i is once again a performance measure, and the β 1,i coefficient represents the investor induced liquidity effects. Table 10 > While all of the performance estimates are positive and statistically significant for every strategy and for both models, the performance measure is in general higher (8 out of the 10 cases) for the aggressive than for the conservative model. The beta estimates are not as straightforward. Of the 20 beta estimates for both models, 17 are statistically significant. More importantly however, we find that for the Aggressive Manger Model, the beta coefficient is positive in 8 of the 10 cases, while for the Conservative Manager Model the beta coefficient is negative in 7 out of the 10 cases. These findings indicate that liquidity shocks may increase risk for conservative managers and enhance performance for aggressive managers.
< Insert
The results in this section suggest that investor induced liquidity is an important variable in the assessment of fund performance. We document a clear and significant relation between fund flows and performance for most hedge fund strategies, but not for FOF. The performance of Fund of Hedge Funds is shown to be far less sensitive to liquidity shocks than hedge funds. We further show that hedge fund managers that are more aggressive in dealing with liquidity shocks perform better than hedge fund managers that take a more conservative view in dealing with liquidity shocks.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines whether the increase in the flow of capital to hedge funds over the period of 1994-2005 had a negative impact on performance. More specifically, we study the relative performance of small versus large hedge funds for individual strategies. Our results indicate that on an absolute return basis, small funds outperform large funds. On a risk-adjusted return basis however, we find that large funds outperform small funds. Moreover, we find that large funds are also shown to hold less liquid assets than smaller funds.
We examine asset growth persistence in hedge funds. We document strong evidence for the presence of one, two and three month's asset growth persistence. In general however, the one-month lag appears to show the highest levels of significance suggesting that the persistence of fund flows is relatively short lived. More capital is likely to follow periods of high growth or successful performance. Moreover, our result suggests that while short-term asset growth persistence exists in the hedge fund industry, individual fund flows may manifest this persistent behavior differently as one, two or three monthly lags.
We decompose the variance of the hedge fund excess returns in order to distinguish between market and idiosyncratic risks. A close look at our results indicates that as expected, small funds have more total risk than large funds. More importantly however, in all of the cases where there is a statistically significant difference between small and large funds, the idiosyncratic risk (RSS) as opposed to their market risk is shown to be the overwhelming cause for the higher overall risk of small funds.
To examine liquidity, we estimate the mean autocorrelation for small and large hedge funds and for each strategy for the three sub-periods. We test the statistical significance between small and large funds with respect to the estimated liquidity variable. Our results show that large funds are less liquid than small funds. Larger funds are usually in a better position to control asset flows. In their attempts to control asset flows, larger funds can more easily afford less favorable liquidity conditions by applying longer lockup periods and redemption fees for early withdrawals. As a result, mangers of larger funds may be able to enjoy a more stable asset base and can implement their strategies more consistently and may also be able to invest in illiquid securities that are not priced on a daily basis and therefore reduce the volatility of the fund. Finally, we model the liquidity risk behavior of hedge fund managers. Our results show that funds that experience positive liquidity shocks generally outperform those that experience negative liquidity shocks. We document a clear and significant relation between fund flows and performance for most hedge fund strategies, but not for FOF. More importantly, except for the fixed-income type of hedge funds, hedge fund managers that are more aggressive in dealing with liquidity shocks perform better than hedge fund managers that take a more conservative view in dealing with liquidity shocks. 
, where R i,t is fund i's return in month t, R m,t is the return of the S&P500 index for month t, R f,t is the return of the T-Bill rate in month t. The sample period is from 1994 through 2005. For a fund to be included, it must have at least 20 valid monthly observations of both assets under management and return. The t-statistics are for the hypothesis that the mean of the coefficient estimate across funds is zero. Table 3 Absolute Fund Returns Sorted by Asset Size
We sort the funds into terciles by assets in each of the three four-year periods (1994-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005) for each hedge fund strategy. We first calculate the average monthly return during a period for each fund. Then we report the cross-sectional mean of the average monthly return for each category. We report the t-statistics for the test of the hypothesis that the difference between Small and Large is zero. Bold numbers indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 Table 4 Sharpe Ratio Sorted by Asset Size
We sort the funds into terciles by assets in each of the three four-year periods (1994-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005) for each hedge fund strategy. We first calculate the average monthly return during a period for each fund. Then we report the cross-sectional mean of the average monthly return for each category. We report the t-statistics for the test of the hypothesis that the difference between Small and Large funds is zero. Bold numbers indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. Table 5 Variance Decomposition of Hedge Fund Returns Variance decomposition results for small versus large hedge funds for each strategy. The t-statistic tests the significance of the differences between small and large funds with respect to market, idiosyncratic and total risk estimates for three consecutive time periods from 1994 to 2005. One, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Table 7 Persistence in Asset Growth: Time-Series Analysis
1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 Hedge Fund Strategy
The following time-series regression model is run for all funds individually during 1994 through 2005.
where R m,t is the return of the S&P500 index for month t, R f,t is the return of the T-Bill rate in month t, AUM i,t is the asset under management for fund i at the end of month t. Cross-sectional averages of regression coefficient estimates and R 2 are reported by strategy. Table 8 Auto-covariance Sorted by Asset Size
The following time-series regressions are estimated individually for each fund over the three four-year periods (1994-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005) : Table 9 Excess Return by Lagged Investor Liquidity
The time-series average of monthly equally weighted hedge fund return in excess of T-Bill rate is reported in this 
